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WALKER V. TEXAS-DIVISION, SONS OF CONFEDERATE 
VETERANS, INC.: SPECIALTY LICENSE PLATES, 
CONFEDERATE FLAGS, AND GOVERNMENT SPEECH 
 





In a previous article1 this author traced the history of the government 
speech doctrine from the time it first appeared in a concurring decision in 
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee,2 to 
its prominent role in Pleasant Grove City v. Summum,3 in which the U.S. 
Supreme Court ruled that the city’s decision to display permanent 
monuments in a public park is a form of government speech, which is neither 
subject to scrutiny under the First Amendment, nor a form of expression to 
which public forum analysis applies. This review demonstrated that the 
intersection between government speech and the First Amendment is very 
tricky terrain, because of the inherent difficulties in determining what is 
government speech, mixed private and government speech, or private speech 
in a limited public forum. 
These difficulties are vividly demonstrated by the recent U.S. Supreme 
Court decision in Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, 
Inc.4 In Walker, the Texas Department of Motor Vehicles Board (“the Board) 
denied the application the Sons of Confederate Veterans, Texas Division 
(“SCV”), a nonprofit entity, for a specialty license plate containing the 
following design: 
  
                                                   
* J.D., Professor of Management, Rohrer College of Business, Rowan University, Glassboro, 
New Jersey. 
1 Edward J. Schoen & Joseph S. Falchek, Pleasant Grove v. Summum: Government Speech 
Takes Center Stage, 20 S. L J. 1 (2010). 
2 412 U.S. 94, 139 n. 7 (1973). 
3 555 U.S. 460 (2009). 
4 135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015). 





Under Texas law, a nonprofit organization seeking to sponsor a 
specialty license plate must submit its proposed design to the Board for its 
approval. The Board may refuse to create the proposed specialty license plate 
for a variety of reasons, one of which is whether the license might be 
offensive to any member of the public. The Board denied SCV’s application 
for the specialty license plate, because public comments showed many 
members of the public were offended by the design and “a significant portion 
of the public associate the confederate flag with organizations advocating 
expressions of hate directed toward people or groups that is demeaning to 
those people or groups.”5 
Claiming that its First Amendment rights had been violated and seeking 
an injunction requiring the Board to approve its specialty license plate 
design, SCV filed suit against the Board in federal district court, which 
entered judgment for the Board. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 
in a divided panel decision, reversed, deciding that specialty license plates 
are private speech and that the Board’s decision constituted viewpoint 
discrimination prohibited by the First Amendment.6 In a 5-4 decision, the 
U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit, and ruled the issuance of 
specialty license plates by Texas was government speech and the Board was 
entitled to refuse to approve and issue SCV’s proposed license plate design.7 
Because the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Summum played a crucial role 
in the analysis of both the majority and the minority opinions, it is likely 
helpful to review that decision preliminarily. 
 
  
                                                   
5 Id. at 2245.  
6 Id.  
7 Id. at 2253. 
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II. PLEASANT GROVE CITY V. SUMMUM 
 
Pleasant Grove City, Utah, maintains a public park containing about a 
dozen, permanent, privately donated displays, including a monument 
containing the Ten Commandments. Summum, a religious organization, 
petitioned Pleasant Grove City to install a monument containing its religious 
principles, the “Seven Aphorisms of Summum,” and Pleasant Grove City 
denied the request. Summum filed suit in federal district court, claiming its 
First Amendment rights were violated. The district court denied Summum’s 
request for a preliminary injunction, and the Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit reversed, determining public parks are traditionally regarded as 
public forums and the exclusion of Summum’s proposed monument was 
unlikely to survive strict scrutiny.8 Deciding Pleasant Grove City was 
engaged in government speech when it decided to accept and display 
monuments in the public park, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded the First 
Amendment was inapplicable and reversed the Tenth Circuit.9 
The U.S. Supreme Court preliminarily described the role and 
importance of government speech, and explained why the First Amendment 
does not regulate or restrict government speech. Without government speech, 
the government could not function, debate and discussion of “issues of great 
concern to the public” would be confined to the private sector, and the 
process of government would be “radically transformed.” 10 Without 
government speech, the public would have no understanding of what the 
government seeks to accomplish and why; and, in order to preserve the 
government’s right to engage in speech, the First Amendment cannot limit 
government speech.11 Otherwise, the government could be restrained by a 
“First Amendment heckler” from expressing its views, and thereby prevented 
from informing society about the policies it seeks to adopt or opposes and 
indeed how it governs.12 In other words, in the absence of protected 
government speech, the government cannot govern.13 
The Court then concluded that Pleasant Grove City engaged in 
government speech when it displayed permanent monuments on public 
property.14 Several factors were considered in reaching this conclusion. First, 
governments have historically displayed monuments to commemorate 
important events, convey a message, or instill feelings in those who view the 
                                                   
8 Summan, 555 U.S. at 465-66.  
9 Id. at 472, 481.  
10 Id. at 467-68. 
11 Id. at 468. 
12 Id.  
13 Id. (“Indeed, it is not easy to imagine how government could function if it lacked this 
freedom.”). 
14 Id. at 470, 472. 
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monument.15 Second, individuals who observe the monument normally 
associate the meaning conveyed by the monument with property owner on 
which the monument is displayed.16 Third, the City maintained control over 
the message conveyed by the monuments by exercising final authority in 
their selection and selecting only those monuments which presented the 
image the City wanted to project.17 Fourth, the City took ownership of the 
monuments and placed them in a park it owns and manages, thereby 
signifying the monument speaks on its behalf.18 Finally, the permanent nature 
of donated monuments and the finite amount of space in a public park 
preclude the application of public forum analysis. More particularly, if public 
forum analysis is applied to public monuments, Pleasant Grove City would 
be forced to accept and display all donated monuments, or to refuse to accept 
any donated monuments and remove monuments already on display to avoid 
exercising viewpoint discrimination. When public forum analysis eliminates 
the forum, it is obviously out of place.19 Notably, then, even though the 
monuments were displayed in a public park, the Court decided public forum 
analysis was inapplicable.20 Hence, the Court concluded, Pleasant Grove 
City’s acceptance of privately donated monuments is government speech 
which is not subject to the First Amendment restrictions.21 
 
III. WALKER MAJORITY OPINION: LICENSE PLATES CONVEY 
GOVERNMENT SPEECH 
 
In the majority opinion in Walker, the Court employed the first four of 
the five factors identified above to buttress its conclusion specialty license 
plates convey government speech.22 First, the Court noted, states have 
                                                   
15 Id. at 470. 
16 Id. at 471. 
17 Id. at 473.  
18 Id. at 474, 476. 
19 Id. at 480. 
20 Id. at 478. 
21 Id. at 481. 
22 The four factors cited in determining specialty license plates are government speech - 
conveyance of a state message on the license plate, identification of the license plate with the 
state, final state approval of the license plate design before issuance, and transmitting the 
stamp of government approval - echo the significant constitutional disputes triggered by the 
State Department’s refusal to issue passports, unilateral revocation of passports, or imposition 
of geographic limitations on travel. Hopefully this will provide an interesting topic for a future 
research project. See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); Dayton v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 144 
(1958); Zemel v. Rusk. 381 U.S. 1 (1965); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981); and United 
States v. Laub, 385 U.S. 475 (1967). See also Thomas E. Laursen, Constitutional Protection of 
Foreign Travel, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 902 (1981); The Right to Travel, 95 HARV. L. REV. 201 
(1981); Jeffrey Kahn, International Travel and the Constitution, 56 UCLA L. REV. 271 (2008); 
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historically employed license plates to convey messages beyond the state 
name and vehicle identification number. The additional messages include: 
depictions of the head of a Hereford steer (Arizona), a codfish 
(Massachusetts), a bucking bronco (Colorado) and a potato (Idaho); and 
slogans such as “Idaho Potatoes,” “North to the Future” (Alaska), “Keep 
Florida Green,” “Hoosier Hospitality,” “Green Mountains” (Vermont), and 
“America’s Dairyland” (Wisconsin).23 Texas, too, communicated various 
messages on its license plates, including: “Hemisfair 68” (to promote a San 
Antonio event); a small silhouette of the State; and “150 years of Statehood.” 
The Texas Legislature also authorized various slogans on license plates: 
“Read to Succeed,” “Houston Livestock Show and Rodeo,” Texans Conquer 
Cancer,” and “Girl Scouts.” 
Second, Texas license plates are closely identified with the State of 
Texas. Not only do they serve the governmental purpose of registering and 
identifying vehicles, but they are issued by the State and each license 
contains the name “Texas” in large letters at the top.  People who design and 
obtain approval of specialty license plates likely intend to convey the 
message of state approval. Otherwise, bumper stickers would suffice. People 
who view Texas license plates easily identify them with the State, and 
believe messages on the specialty license plates have been endorsed by Texas 
through its approval process. 
Third, Texas directly and exclusively controls the messages appearing 
on its specialty license plates through the approval process, thereby reserving 
for itself final approval authority over what messages it wants conveyed to 
the public. It can celebrate educational institutions attended by its citizens, 
but can reject slogans deriding schooling. It can pay tribute to Texas’ citrus 
industry, but need not tout Florida’s oranges. It can offer plates saying “Fight 
Terrorism,” but can refuse to promote al Qaeda.24 
Fourth, the messages conveyed on specialty license plates not only have 
been approved by the Board, but appear directly below the large letters 
identifying “Texas” as the issuer of the plates. The approved designs “are 
meant to convey and have the effect of conveying a government message, 
and they thus constitute government speech,” thereby making forum analysis 
misplaced and First Amendment restrictions inapplicable.25 
The Court conceded the fifth factor was inapplicable. While a park can 
hold only a finite number of monuments, the Board can theoretically approve 
                                                                                                                        
Jeffrey Kahn, The Extraordinary Mrs. Shipley: How the United States Controlled 
International Travel Before the Age of Terrorism, 43 Conn. L. Rev. 819 (2011); and Ramzi 
Kasseem, Passport Revocation as Proxy Denaturalization: Examining the Yemen Cases, 82 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2099 (2014). 
23 Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 2248. 
24 Id. at 2249. 
25 Id. at 2250. 
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as many license plate designs as are submitted and need not make them 
available forever. Nonetheless, the Court reasoned the public forum analysis 
was inapplicable, because “license plates are not traditional public forums for 
private speech.”26 
 
IV. WALKER DISSENTING OPINION: LICENSE PLATES ARE LIMITED 
PUBLIC FORUMS 
 
The dissenting opinion in Walker immediately takes issue with the 
classification of specialty license plates as government speech, asking the 
reader to imagine she is sitting on the side of the road watching the license 
plates speed by. Would the reader honestly believe the license plate that says 
“Rather be Golfing” conveys official state policy or means Texas is 
promoting golf over tennis or bowling? That permitting the names Notre 
Dame, Oklahoma State, University of Oklahoma, Kansas State and Iowa 
State to appear on license plates meant Texas was officially rooting, not for 
the Texas Longhorns, but for the other team?27 The dissent insists that 
placing these messages under the umbrella of government speech creates a 
dangerous precedent that “takes a large and painful bite out of the First 
Amendment.”28 It strips away all constitutional protection of whatever 
message the motorist has paid a premium to place on the license plate, and 
permits the state to engage in viewpoint discrimination when it approves 
some but rejects other specialty license plates.29 
The dissent characterizes specialty license plates as small, mobile 
billboards, a portion of which can be used by the vehicle’s owner to display a 
selected message, provided that message is preliminarily approved by the 
Board. The dissent asks the reader to imagine the state or a state university 
erecting a large, stationery, electronic billboard, some space on which can be 
rented by individuals who want to post a message, and renting that space 
only if the state found the message to be sufficiently noncontroversial or 
consistent with prevailing state or university views. No one could doubt, the 
dissent insists, that such a scenario involved blatant viewpoint discrimination 
which violates the First Amendment.30 
The dissent also notes that the “contrast between the history of public 
monuments . . . and the Texas license plate program could not be starker.”31 
Governments have accepted and displayed of monuments for centuries; 
                                                   
26 Id. at 2551. 
27 Id. at 2255.  
28 Id.  
29 Id. at 2255-56. 
30 Id. at 2256. 
31 Id. at 2260.  
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private party sponsorship of specialty license plates is comparatively quite 
new. The display of permanent monuments is limited by available space; 
specialty license plates have no limits beyond their sponsors. Government 
selects the monument to be displayed; the Board, attentive to the need to 
enhance state revenues, encourages sponsors to submit designs and routinely 
approves them. Monuments convey the message the government seeks to 
communicate; specialty license plates convey sponsor created messages, not 
messages the government supports.32 That sponsors’ desire to obtain the 
state’s “seal of approval” of their messages transforms the message to 
government speech is “dangerous reasoning,” because it ignores the huge 
difference between speech the government employs to further its programs 
and speech of private parties to which the government attaches its blessing or 
condemnation.33 
The dissent concludes that selling space for messages on specialty 
license plates creates a limited public forum, because Texas permits state 
property (motor vehicle licenses) to be used by private speakers to convey 
their messages consistent with the rules of its approval process. Those rules, 
however, cannot permit viewpoint discrimination, and denying approval to 
SCV’s confederate flag design because it may be offensive to others is “pure 
viewpoint discrimination.”34 
 
V. SIGNIFICANCE OF WALKER 
 
The assessment of Walker by legal scholars has been limited. Helen 
Norton, Professor of Law at the University of Colorado School of Law, 
criticizes Walker, because the Court “again missed an important opportunity 
to clarify and refine its government speech doctrine to require that the 
government make clear when it is speaking before it can assert the 
government speech defense to Free Speech challenges.”35 David A. 
Anderson, the Fred and Emily Marshall Wulff Centennial Chair in Law at the 
University of Texas School of Law, criticizes Walker, because it insists there 
is a binary division between private and government speech, and ignores the 
growing phenomenon of the public/private partnerships in which (1) private 
sector companies run state prisons and public hospitals, fund university 
research, and manage public schools, (2) public/private partners develop 
sports facilities and office buildings, (3) the roles of private security officers 
and public officers intermingle and overlap, and (4) private companies are 
                                                   
32 Id. at 2260-62. 
33 Id. at 2261.  
34 Id. at 2262. 
35 Helen Norton, Government Speech and Political Courage, 68 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 61, 62 
(2015). 
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given powers of eminent domain. These public/private partnerships extend 
and blur the realm of speech, permitting government to promote beef, grapes, 
apples and citrus fruits, advertise soft drinks on university stadium 
scoreboards, and license the city of Dallas logo to promote the sales of 
insurance. Not addressing the public/private phenomenon the case overlooks 
“an opportunity to look for a more cogent way to deal with the privatization 
boom.”36 
The immediate impact of Walker is to give “significant leeway to states 
to issue or deny specialty plates as they see fit,”37 and avoid legal skirmishes 
over whether to permit a confederate flag or Nazi swastika, right-to-life or 
pro-choice sentiments, gun rights or gun control advocacy, or promotions of 
controversial enterprises (tobacco and mining), sports (fox hunting), or team 
names (Washington Redskins) on specialty license plates.38 
The broader implication of Walker is whether or not government control 
over application procedures might permit the government “to censor a 
broader range of private speech simply by claiming some level of 
governmental involvement.”39 This is demonstrated in part by six subsequent 
decisions that have substantively discussed Walker. Four of those decisions 
concluded government speech trumps First Amendment claims. Two did not. 
                                                   
36 David A. Anderson, Of Horses, Donkey, and Mules, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2015) 
37 David L. Hudson, Jr., October 2014 Term: First Amendment Review, 42 ABA PREVIEW 281, 
282 (2015). See Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Holcomb, 2015 W.L 4662435 at 1, 4 
(W.D. Va. 2015) (vacating the district court’s prior order enjoining the enforcement of that 
portion of the Virginia Code which banned the placement of the Sons of Confederate Veterans 
logo containing the Confederate flat on license plates).  
38 Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 2262. See 
Holcomb, 2015 WL 4662435 at 4: 
When the Supreme Court speaks, district courts must listen. In light of the ruling in 
Walker, the primary rationale for the 2001 judgment and injunction in this case is no 
longer good law. Specialty license plates represent the government's speech, and the 
Commonwealth may choose, consonant with the First Amendment, the message it 
wishes to convey on those plates. The Commonwealth's rationale for singling out SCV 
for different treatment is no longer relevant. According to the Supreme Court, the 
Commonwealth is free to treat SCV differently from all other specialty groups. Because 
the underlying injunction violates that right, I have no choice but to dissolve it. 
Because Texas does not require its specialty license holders to adopt an approved license 
design, Walker likely does not face a challenge on the grounds of compelled speech. See 
Cressman v. Thompson, 798 F.3d 938, 956-958 (10th Cir. 2015) (while requiring license 
holders to display the image of a Native American Indian crouched down and shooting an 
arrow into the clouds may constitute compelled speech, the license holder ”explicitly 
indicated” the image was not personally objectionable to him). Cressman is discussed more 
fully below in this article. 
39 Hudson supra note 32, at 282. 
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In Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse,40 the federal district court ruled that 
the federal trademark registration program is government speech and 
therefore exempt from First Amendment scrutiny.41 Amanda Blackhorse and 
four other individuals (“Defendants”) filed a petition with the Trademark 
Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) to cancel the six registrations of the logo of 
the Washington Redskins professional football team owned by Pro-Football, 
Inc. Finding that the marks “may disparage a substantial composite of Native 
Americans and bring them into contempt or disrepute,” TTAB scheduled the 
cancellation of the registered marks under Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act. 
The parties then sought a de nova review of TTAB’s decision in the federal 
district court based on the record before TTAB and additional evidence the 
parties submitted. Pro-Football, Inc. claimed, among other things, that 
Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act violated the First Amendment.42 
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants 
denying Pro-Football’s First Amendment claim, because: (1) cancelling the 
registrations of the Redskins marks under Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act 
does not burden, restrict, or prohibit Pro-Football, Inc.’s ability to use the 
marks, and does not restrict any expression,43 and (2) the federal trademark 
registration program is government speech exempt from First Amendment 
protection.44 The basis of the latter decision was Walker. The district court 
found that the federal trademark registration program communicates the 
message the federal government has approved the trademark,” and that “the 
public closely associates federal trademark registration with the federal 
government.” “[T]he insignia for federal trademark registration, ®, is a 
manifestation of the federal government’s recognition of the mark,” and “the 
federal government exercises editorial control over the federal trademark 
registration program.” Further, Section 2(a) “empowers the PTO to deny or 
cancel a mark’s registration, and thus control what appears on the Principal 
Register.”45 Because the Walker factors demonstrated the trademark 
registration program is government speech,” it is exempt from First 
Amendment scrutiny and Pro-Football’s First Amendment claim must fail.46 
                                                   
40 112 F. Supp.3d 439 (E.D. Va. 2015), appeal docketed, No 15-1874 (4th Cir. Aug. 6, 2015).  
41 Id. at 8, 11, and 12. 
42 Id. at 2-4. 
43 Id. at 9. 
44 Id. at 8. 
45 Id. at 12. 
46 Id. at 17. Contra In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1335-1336, 1346-1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015), (en 
banc) (the refusal of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) to register the trademark 
“The Slants” for a musical band on the grounds the mark was disparaging to people of Asian 
descent is a content-based restriction which cannot survive strict scrutiny, and the issuance of 
a trademark registration by TTAB is not government speech). The Federal Circuit Court 
decision makes it likely the U.S. Supreme Court will review whether trademark registration is 
government speech. See Debra Cassens Weiss, Ban on disparaging trademarks violates First 
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In United Veterans Memorial and Patriotic Ass’n of the City of New 
Rochelle v. City of New Rochelle,47 Plaintiffs, United Veterans Memorial and 
Patriotic Association of the City of New Rochelle (“United Veterans”) and 
Peter Parente, objected to City Council’s decision to remove the “Gadsden 
Flag” from a flagpole on the New Rochelle armory.48 The flag had flown 
below the American flag, which had become tattered and worn. When the 
American flag was replaced, the Gadsden Flag was removed. A subsequent 
motion to restore the Gadsden Flag made at a City Council meeting was 
defeated by a vote of 5-2, and Plaintiffs claimed the removal of the flag 
violates their First Amendment rights.49 The District Court dismissed 
Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim.50 On 
appeal, the Second Circuit ruled the display of flags on the City of New 
Rochelle’s Amory constituted government speech under Walker. When the 
Armory was deeded to the City of New Rochelle, the deed required that the 
property remain open for public use for recreation, park, highway and street 
purposes. While the City of New Rochelle delegated the selection of flags to 
the United Veterans, the display of flags constituted government speech, 
which did not implicate the First Amendment. Displaying and maintaining 
flags on its flagpole did not create a public forum or diminish the control of 
the flags displayed. The flagpole was owned by the government and located 
in a public space used for recreational purposes, and a reasonable observer 
would believe the flags conveyed a message of the City of New Rochelle.51 
Once again, then, government speech trumped a First Amendment claim. 
In American Freedom Defense Initiative v. King County,52 the King 
County’s public transit agency (“Metro”), which operates an extensive public 
transportation system in the Seattle metropolitan area, rejected an 
advertisement submitted by Plaintiff, American Freedom Defense Initiative 
                                                                                                                        





47 72 F.Supp.3d 468 (S.D. N.Y. 2014).  
48 Id. at 471. The Gadsden Flag is historically important. It is named after Christopher 
Gadsden, who gave it to the Continental Navy in 1775. It is yellow and depicts a coiled 
rattlesnake above the words “Don’t Tread on Me.” Plaintiffs contend the flag honors 
represents the Nation’s proud history and strength, and honors the sacrifices of Navy and 
Marine veterans who served under the Gadsden Flag throughout the nation’s history.  
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 478. 
51 Veterans Mem’l and Patriotic Ass’n of the City of New Rochelle v. City of New Rochelle, 
615 Fed. Appx. 693 (2d Cir. 2015). 
52 796 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2015). 
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(AFDI), because the ad failed to meet its guidelines.53 Metro’s 2012 
advertising policy, which was in effect when Metro rejected Plaintiff’s ad, 
generally accepts advertisements unless they fall into eleven categories.54 In 
2013, Metro had approved an ad submitted by the United States Department 
of State, which contained the names and photos of 16 individuals under the 
caption “Faces of Global Terrorism” and stated: “Stop a Terrorist. Save lives. 
Up to $25 Million Reward.”55 After the ad appeared on the bus exteriors, 
Metro received complaints from the public, including a member of Congress 
and two community leaders, who claimed the ad was offensive and would 
foment mistreatment of racial, ethnic and religious minorities, who had 
similar appearances or names to the persons shown in the ad. Metro initiated 
a review of its advertising criteria, and the State Department voluntarily 
retracted the ad.56 
Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff submitted a substantially similar ad to 
Metro, containing the same names, photos and caption, with the following 
statements: “AFDI Wants You to Stop a Terrorist” and “The FBI is Offering 
Up to $25 Million Reward If You Help Capture One of These Jihadis.”57 
Metro concluded the AFDI’s advertisement did not comply with its 
advertising criteria and declined to display Plaintiff’s ad on Metro’s buses.58 
Rather than discussing the rejection of the ad with Metro, Plaintiff filed an 
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 contending its First Amendment rights were 
violated and seeking an injunction ordering Metro to publish its ad.59 
The Ninth Circuit determined that Metro did not intend to create a 
public forum in accepting advertisements on its buses, but rather created a 
nonpublic forum, because it employed a prescreening process to review 
submitted ads, rejected a range of proposed ads including other public-issue 
ads, and placed the ads on the buses whose primary purpose is to provide 
public transportation. The Ninth Circuit noted that this conclusion was 
confirmed by Walker, which held the exercise of final authority over content 
“mitigates against the determination Texas created a public forum” on its 
license plates.60 Having created a nonpublic forum, Metro’s rejection of 
                                                   
53 Id. at 1167.  
54 Id. Metro’s 2012 advertising policy generally accepted advertisements unless they fell into 
eleven categories: (1) “political campaign speech”; (2) “tobacco, alcohol, firearms and adult-
related products and services”; (3) “sexual or excretory subject matter”; (4) “false or 
misleading”; (5) “copyright, trademark, or otherwise unlawful”; (6) illegal activity”; (7) 
“profanity and violence”’ (8) “demeaning or disparaging”; (9) “harmful or disruptive to transit 
system”; (10) “lights, noise, and special effects”; and (11) “unsafe transit behavior.” 
55 Id.  
56 Id.  
57 Id. at 1168. 
58 Id.  
59 Id.  
60 Id. at 1170. 
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Plaintiff’s ad must be reasonable and viewpoint neutral.61 Both criteria were 
satisfied, the Tenth Circuit decided, because the ad was false and misleading 
(the Department of State, not the FBI, offered the rewards), and there was no 
evidence in the record suggesting “Metro would have accepted the ad with 
the same inaccuracy if only the ad has expressed a different viewpoint or that 
Metro had accepted other ads containing false statements.”62 
In Mech v. School Board of Palm Beach County,63 the School Board 
overseeing the Palm Beach County School District permitted schools to hang 
banners on their fences recognizing sponsors of school programs as “Partners 
in Excellence.”64 The banners were subject to several conditions. The 
principal of each school was required to select and approve business partners 
that were consistent with the school district’s educational mission and 
community values. The banners, visible from the road, had to be a “uniform 
size, color and font” and express gratitude to the sponsor; the banners listed 
the name, phone number, web address and logo of the business partner, but 
could not include a photograph or large logo.65 Three schools in the district 
displayed banners acknowledging David Mech, who offered math tutoring 
services under the name “The Happy/Fun Math Tutor.” Mech also happened 
to be a retired porn star, who had performed in hundreds of pornographic 
films, and who owns Dave Pounder Productions LLC, a company that 
formerly produced pornography. Both the Happy/Fun Math Tutor and Dave 
Pounder Productions share a mailing address in Boca Raton, Florida. When 
several parents discovered the common ownership of The Happy/Fun Math 
Tutor and Dave Pounder Productions and complained about Mech’s banners, 
the schools removed the banners on the grounds the connection between the 
two enterprises was inconsistent with the schools’ educational mission and 
community values.66 Mech sued the School Board for violating his First 
Amendment rights. Both parties moved for summary judgment, and the 
district court determined the removal of the banner did not abridge the First 
Amendment and ruled in favor of the School Board. Mech appealed to the 
Eleventh Circuit.67 
  
                                                   
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 1171. Contra Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 70 F.Supp.3d 572 
(S.D. N.Y. 2015). Unlike the license plates in Walker, advertising space on New York City 
Metropolitan Transportation Authority buses was a public forum, because that space is 
traditionally available for private speech and there was no indication that the speech was 
owned or conveyed by the government. Id. at n. 4. 
63 806 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir. 2015). 
64 Id. at 1 and 2. 
65 Id. at 2. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
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The Court of Appeals decided that the removal of Mech’s banners from 
the schools did not violate the First Amendment, because under Walker the 
decision to do was government speech.68 The Court considered the three 
factors applied in Walker in making its determination: history, endorsement 
and control. Because there was little or no evidence in the record detailing 
the history of the school banner program beyond its being launched in 2008, 
the Court, cautioning that “a long historical pedigree is not a prerequisite for 
government speech,” concluded the first factor weighed in Mech’s favor. The 
second factor – government endorsement of the message conveyed by the 
banner – squarely suggested the banners were government speech. The 
banners were hung on school fences, and the public closely identifies 
messages appearing on school district property with the school district. 
Further the banner contains the school’s initials, is printed in the school’s 
colors, and identifies the sponsor as a “Partner in Excellence” with the 
school, clearly conveying the message that the sponsor has a close 
relationship and works with the school.69 Further, Mech’s banner, promoting 
tutoring services in math, containing the schools initials and colors, and 
labeling the Happy/Fun Math Tutor as a partner in excellence, creates the 
clear impression the school endorsed the tutoring services.70 The third factor 
– control over the message – “strongly suggests” the banners are government 
speech.71 The schools dictate: the design, typeface and color of the banners; 
the information contained in the banner; the banner size and location; and the 
inclusion of the school’s initials and the Partner in Excellence message. 
Further the school’s principal exercises final approval of the banner before it 
is displayed. In short, the “message set out in [a banner] is from beginning to 
end the message established by the school.”72 Because the display of the 
Happy/Fun Math Tutor is government speech, Mech’s First Amendment 
must fail. Hence, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the decision of the district 
court.73 
As noted above, two other decisions, which also substantively discussed 
Walker, declined to extend the reach of government speech. In Cressman v. 
Thompson.74 a motorist objected to the depiction of a Native American 
shooting an arrow toward the sky on Oklahoma state vehicle license plates, 
claiming the display of the license plate on his car compelled him to 
communicate a pantheistic message which was contrary to his religious 
                                                   
68 Id. at 4. 
69 Id. at 5 and 6. 
70 Id. at 6. 
71 Id. at 7. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 798 F.3d 938 (10th Cir. 2015). 
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beliefs.75 The Tenth Circuit ruled that even though the display of the drawing 
on the license plate conveyed a government message and qualified as 
government speech under Walker,76 it nonetheless could still implicate the 
First Amendment rights of individuals objecting to the message. The Court 
noted that “the affixation of objectionable speech on a standard license plate 
implicates compelled speech concerns if it forces a vehicle owner . . . [to 
foster] a point of view he finds unacceptable.”77 The Court then discussed the 
nature of the drawing appearing on the license plate, and concluded it was 
symbolic speech, which an objective observer would interpret as conveying 
the message that Oklahoma’s history and culture was strongly influenced by 
Native Americans.78 This message was not one to which Cressman objected. 
Rather he objected to the religious message conveyed by the drawing. 
Because he did not object to the message a reasonable observer would 
receive from the drawing, Cressman was not compelled to utter a view he 
opposed and could not succeed in his compelled speech claim.79 
Likewise, in Rideout v. Gardner,80 voters challenged a New Hampshire 
statute prohibiting them from disclosing or displaying a digital or 
photographic copy of their completed ballots.81 The voters claimed the law 
violated their right of political expression, because it prohibited them from 
posting copies of their completed ballots in social media.82 The Secretary of 
State defended the statute by arguing that, under Walker, “completed ballots 
are a form of government speech and thus do not trigger First Amendment 
protection at all.83 The district court quickly dismissed this argument, 
because (1) ballots do not communicate a state message, but merely list the 
slate of candidates; (2) there is no possibility a voter’s marking on the ballot 
                                                   
75 Id. at 944. The drawing on the Oklahoma license plates depicts a sculpture entitled “Sacred 
Rain Arrow” by Allan Houser, an award-winning Chiricahua Apache sculpture. The sculpture 
tells the story of a young Apache Indian who fired an arrow blessed by a medicine man and 
carrying prayers for rain into the sky to convince the spirits to release rain. The plaintiff, Keith 
Cressman, claimed the drawing on the license plate promotes belief in multiple gods and the 
use of arrows as means of prayer, contrary to his Christian belief in one god and Jesus Christ 
as the mediator between God and all people. Id. at 943.  
76 Id. at 948. 
77 Id. at 950. 
78 Id. at 957, 960. 
79 Id. at 963, 964. 
80 123 F. Supp. 218 (D.N.H. 2015). 
81 N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 659:35, 1 (2016): “No voter shall allow his or her ballot to be seen 
by any person with the intention of letting it be known how he or she is about to vote or how 
he or she has voted except as provided in RSA 659:20 [allowing voters who need assistance 
marking the ballot to receive assistance]. This prohibition shall include taking a digital image 
or photograph of his or her marked ballot and distributing or sharing the image via social 
media or by any other means.” 
82 Id.  
83 Id. at 10. 
Spring 2017 Schoen/49 
 
 
will be interpreted as state speech; and (3) the state does not control the 
messages people convey on ballots beyond requiring they place no 
distinguishing mark on their ballot.84 Hence the markings voters place on 
their ballots do not constitute government speech.85 The Secretary of State 
also maintained that the principal purpose of the law was to prevent vote 
buying and voter coercion.86 The district court determined that prohibiting 
the display of completed ballots was a content-based restriction that must be 
reviewed under strict scrutiny.87 Because the government produced no 
evidence showing that “the state has an actual or imminent problem with 
images of completed ballots being used to facilitate either vote buying or 
voter coercion” or even “a single instance anywhere in the United States . . . 
that digital or photographic images of completed ballots have been used to 
facilitate vote buying or voter coercion,” it failed to demonstrate the law 
serves a compelling state interest and hence flunks strict scrutiny.88 
The limited number of post-Walker decisions restricts an assessment of 
whether Walker has extended the reach of government speech. Pro-Football, 
Inc. lost the registered status of its six Washington Redskins trademarks 
(though not the use of those trademarks), because the TTAB controls the 
application process for approval of trademarks and makes the ultimate 
regulatory decision on granting or denying the extension of trademark 
applications. The City of New Rochelle, the grantee of the City’s Amory, 
required to hold the property for public use, retained ultimate authority to 
determine what flags would be displayed on its flagpoles on the Amory 
property. The King’s County public transit agency was not required to accept 
the advertising message of AFDI, because the transit agency employed an 
approval procedure for submitted advertisements and retained control over 
which ads would be affixed to its buses. Schools within the Palm Beach 
County School District exercised government speech when they displayed 
(and removed) banners expressing gratitude for the assistance of sponsors of 
school programs and designated those sponsors as “Partners in Excellence.” 
On the other hand, the Tenth Circuit ruled that the authority of 
Oklahoma to approve the design and insignia on its license plates did not 
preclude a First Amendment claim of compelled speech, and a federal district 
court has ruled that New Hampshire’s prohibition against displaying a copy 
of a completed election ballot violated the First Amendment, because it 
prevented voters from engaging in political expression by publicizing their 
completed ballots on social media. 
                                                   
84 Id. 
85 Id.  
86 Rideout, supra note 47, at 8.  
87 Id. at 9. 
88 Id. at 12-13. 





Walker makes an interesting addition to the government speech terrain. 
The majority opinion, relying heavily on Summum, determined that a 
specialty state license plate constitutes government speech not subject to 
First Amendment restrictions, because states convey messages on license 
plates, are closely identified with license plates, exercise final approval of the 
license plate design, and convey the stamp of state approval. Hence similar 
government message approval processes, such as registering a trademark, 
deciding what flags may fly on public property, approving advertisements on 
public transit vehicles, and placing banners on school fences expressing 
gratitude to their “Partners in Excellence” constitute government speech 
which is not restricted by the First Amendment. It will be very interesting to 
learn where the Summum/Walker factors will coalesce in the future to expand 
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